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Reconciliation and perpetrator memories in Cambodia 
 
This article considers the reproduction of perpetrator memories to reflect on processes of reconciliation in 
Cambodia. The article explores the circulation of memories around local memorial and heritage sites within 
a former Khmer Rouge (KR) community, Anlong Veng. Anlong Veng was home to several senior KR leaders, 
two of whom were found guilty of crimes against humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC). The article draws on ethnographic and interview data to illustrate examples of the 
traction, limits and dissonances that flow from the ECCC and its attendant discourses of ‘national 
reconciliation’, as they intersect with local accounts of the past. I argue that while perpetrator and ‘counter’ 
memories can have the potential to disrupt reconciliation, the case reveals complexities in the reproduction 
of memories of atrocity among both victim and perpetrator groups that appear simultaneously 
‘unreconciled’ and commensurable to the ECCC project. In doing so, the article opens a critical space for 
reflections on the place of perpetrator memories in reconciliation initiatives and human rights scholarship.    
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This article explores the implications that perpetrator memories and memories about perpetrators have for 
reconciliation in Cambodia. While efforts to do justice to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge (KR) years 
(1975-1979) are ongoing, anchored around prosecutions of the surviving KR leadership at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), questions of reconciliation in Cambodia also remain 
persistent and outstanding. The ECCC is a principally retributive mechanism but it is heavily implicated in 
Cambodia’s politics of ‘national reconciliation’ because of the way it focuses on the KR leadership, eliding 
the culpability of lower level perpetrators. Reconciliatory endeavours in Cambodia more broadly have 
situated rank and file KR perpetrators as key parties to reconciliation, and scholarship and advocacy on 
Cambodia often locate lower level KR as victims of the regime. Moreover, wider NGO sponsored 
reconciliatory initiatives in Cambodia are often also attached to the work of the ECCC, and therefore pivot 
on the denunciation of the KR leadership as a starting point and premise. On this basis, questions of memory 
are pushed front and centre. Trials are crucial sites for writing public histories and framing social memory, 
symbolically demarcating troubled pasts from renewed presents. Moreover, they often invoke a collective 
‘national’ memory as the key site of redress and restoration.1 The role of the ECCC as an agent of 
reconciliation implicates conflicting ‘unreconciled’ perpetrator memories because competing versions of the 
past can challenge and disrupt the production of stable, common narratives about the meaning and lessons of 
the KR years.  
 
                                               
1 Moon, Claire. "States of acknowledgement: the politics of memory, apology, and therapy."  In Crime, Social Control 
and Human Rights: From Moral Panics to States of Denial, Essays in Honour of Stanley Cohen (2007: 314. Devon, 
UK: Willan Publishing.) 
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This article draws on ethnographic and in-depth interviews to reflect on the circulation of memory around 
heritage and memorial sites in Anlong Veng, a small town in northern Cambodia. Anlong Veng is an 
important research site because it is governed and populated by former KR cadre and was home to several 
senior KR leaders, two of whom were found guilty of crimes against humanity at the ECCC and still face 
trial for charges of genocide. As such, ECCC sponsored outreach initiatives treat Anlong Veng as an 
important locale for reconciliation initiatives and the provision of genocide education. On this basis, Anlong 
Veng is a both an exceptional and unique research context. It offers neither a generalizable account of 
perpetrator memories among the KR, nor a complete picture of the complex challenges for reconciliation in 
Cambodia today. The case is, however, instructive for our understanding of dynamics of reconciliation in 
Cambodia, and the way that key parties to reconciliation are able to talk and think about their memories of 
the KR, and the attendant implications for ‘national reconciliation’. 
  
The first section of the article examines the relationships between reconciliation and memory. I suggest that 
while memory and reconciliation are contingent, socially and politically mediated frameworks for 
understanding and acting on the past, memory is integral to reconciliatory politics and has the power to 
disrupt initiatives intended to reconcile parties. The second section outlines the politics of “national 
reconciliation” in Cambodia today. I show that the ECCC (re)animates and anchors a politics of 
reconciliation that pivots on the denunciation of the KR leadership, while enacting a de facto amnesty for 
lower level perpetrators of atrocity. Following a brief discussion of methods, the article proceeds to consider 
examples of conflicting memory that appear simultaneously ‘unreconciled’ and yet commensurable to the 
ECCC project. Three themes gleaned from fieldwork in Anlong Veng are explored, showing how the 
traction, limits and discordances of reconciliatory politics are visible in the case at hand. Perpetrator 
memories and memories of perpetrators are uneven, contested and changing.  I identify a tendency towards 
the hagiography of a (now deceased) KR leader, Chit Chuon, alias Ta Mok, noting the way that similar 
generous remembrances are not observed for other KR leaders, like Pol Pot. Ta Mok was the KR military 
chief from 1977 and responsible for some of the worst atrocities perpetrated under the KR, earning him the 
moniker of ‘the butcher’. These examples, superficially, seem in conflict with how reconciliation might pivot 
on the denunciation of the KR leadership (and therefore the ECCC). I suggest that the existence of memories 
that celebrate KR figures like Ta Mok, however, emerges from a sense of nostalgia, obligation, and the 
currency of nationalist tropes of patriotism, vulnerability and solidarity that reframe memory in the present. 
Moreover, against this, material and economic development appears to undermine the persistence and 
salience of memories of perpetrators. I argue that these memories register on frameworks that are dislocated 
from the way the ECCC lays claim over the past because claims over memory that are principally juridical, 
symbolic and national operate on a different level to vernacular and contextually embedded memories, 
converging and diverging in complex ways. On this basis, the circulation of perpetrator memories raises 
questions for reconciliatory practices within Cambodia - and transitional justice more broadly - concerning 
the extent to which reconciliation must transform or accommodate conflicting memories of past violence. 
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 “National reconciliation” and the ECCC  
 
The question of reconciliation in Cambodia remains fraught because we see multiple and often conflicted 
claims over what reconciliation might mean and entail. Given Cambodia’s long history of conflict and mass 
atrocity, there are important questions to ask concerning exactly which parties should be reconciled, and the 
events around which reconciliation must pivot. The range of actors implicated in Cambodia’s bloody history 
means we must be cautious about the contingency of any claims for reconciliation and that appeals for 
reconciliation invariably obfuscate or exclude some memories of political violence, as they call for 
reconciliation around others. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive account of all 
reconciliatory initiatives in Cambodia, and the forms of reconciliation that they envisage. These range widely 
and include genocide education initiatives intended to prevent the future recurrence of atrocity,2 or efforts to 
raise awareness about trauma and mental health that emphasise personal healing and reconciliation.3 It is 
notable that NGOs have led a broad range of reconciliatory enterprises in Cambodia across a range of 
contexts, and play a central role in conducting ECCC outreach work, screening verdicts, and soliciting 
complaints and applications for recognition as victims by the ECCC as ‘civil parties’.4 The focus of this 
article, however, is those state sanctioned claims for national reconciliation anchored at the ECCC that are 
most seriously implicated by the circulation of perpetrator memories in the case of Anlong Veng.  
 
The state sponsored claim to ‘national reconciliation’ in Cambodia is rooted in a specific political history. 
The language and narrative of national reconciliation emerged in 1979, when Vietnamese troops and 
Cambodian rebel factions captured Phnom Penh and removed the KR from power. Tasked with massive 
social reconstruction, and facing the beginning of what would be a further twenty years of civil war, the 
newly established People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK 1979-1989) sought to entice defections from those 
KR insurgents deemed not bear ‘blood debts’, while at the same time denouncing Pol Pot and other KR 
leaders for perverting an otherwise happy revolution.5 The twin planks of this account of the KR years – 
defined by the guilt of senior leaders and exculpation of the rank and file – materialised at a 1979 ‘People’s 
Tribunal’, which was established in Phnom Penh to try the KR leadership in absentia, and in subsequent 
amnesty programmes offered throughout the 1980s and 1990s that continued to offer protections for lower 
level KR from prosecution. Here we see key memory techniques – punishment and amnesty – working hand 
in hand to demarcate and smooth the transition from an old era from a new one.  
 
                                               
2  See, for example, the report from the erection of a genocide memorial in Phnom Malai 
http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Genocide_Education_in_Cambodia_May_10_2013.pdf Last accessed 
31st May 2015  
3 Information about TPO programmes is available at http://tpocambodia.org/index.php?id=justiceandreliefforsurvivors. 
Last accessed 27th May 2015 
4 Sperfeldt, Christophe. "Cambodian civil society and the KR tribunal." International Journal of Transitional 
Justice (2012): ijr037. 
5 Gottesman, Evan. Cambodia after the KR: Inside the politics of nation building. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003). 
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An important historical parallel exists here with the ongoing prosecutions at the ECCC because the ECCC 
focuses principally on the role of KR leaders, while exculpating lower level perpetrators. The ECCC were 
established in 2006 following agreement between the UN and Royal Government of Cambodia to prosecute 
“senior leaders” and “those most responsible” for crimes committed between 1975 and 1979 during the 
“Democratic Kampuchea” period. Between these years, an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died of 
starvation, disease, or were executed.6 The ECCC is a mixed ‘hybrid’ institution that incorporates both 
Cambodian and international judicial and administrative personnel (though judgments rely on a ‘super-
majority’ weighting toward the balance of Cambodian judges). The ECCC has worked on four cases to date, 
two of which have gone to trial; it remains uncertain whether investigations into a third and fourth case, 003 
and 004, will proceed further.7 In 2012 the former head of the ‘S-21’ security centre in Phnom Penh, ‘Duch’, 
was sentenced to life imprisonment having been found guilty of crimes against humanity in Case 001. Case 
002 focuses on the role of surviving “senior leaders” of the KR. In 2013, in order to expedite proceedings, 
following the death of one key defendant, Ieng Sary, and the severance of another, Ieng Thirith, due to ill 
health, Case 002 was broken into more manageable ‘mini’ trials. In August 2014, two surviving senior KR 
leaders, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, were found guilty for crimes against humanity for their role in the 
evacuation of Phnom Penh in 1975 and sentenced to life imprisonment in the first part of Case 002/01. Case 
002/02 is currently ongoing and deals with the difficult question of whether genocide was perpetrated by the 
KR.  
 
Prosecutions beyond Cases 001 and 002 have met fierce resistance from the Cambodian government, 
principally on the basis of the apparent threat posed to processes of reconciliation. Investigations into Cases 
003 and 004 have continuously faced public opposition from leading Cambodian government officials, 
including the Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has suggested that further trials could lead to a resumption of 
war.8 In this sense, the delimitation of the ECCC mandate to focus only on the KR leadership, alongside 
domestic pressure to contain the breadth of prosecutions, shows how the ECCC is implicated in a wider 
history of (state sponsored) claims for national reconciliation. In this light, the ECCC closely mirrors the 
appeals for reconciliation that underpinned the 1979 People’s Tribunal: a personalised story of the guilt of 
the few rather than the many emerged, eliding the possible culpability of mid and lower KR members. The 
ECCC states that lower level KR have nothing to fear, and ECCC partner groups have been quick to locate 
lower level KR as victims of the regime, enacting a de facto amnesty for lower level KR.  
 
On the one hand, human rights groups have been critical of claims for national reconciliation because they 
are thought to operate as a tool for the Cambodian People’s Party (the continuation party of the former PRK 
government) to protect senior members from scrutiny of their roles during the KR years. Human rights 
                                               
6 The ECCC also has a novel reparative function in that it offers officially recognised victim associations ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘moral’ compensation.  
7 Arrest warrants were recently issued for suspects in Cases 003 and 004 though, as of May 2015, these have not been 
executed. 
8 See, for example https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/hun-sen-warns-of-civil-war-if-eccc-goes-beyond-limit-
78757/. Last accessed 24th May 2015. 
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organisations do not see prosecutions in Cases 003 and 004 as a problem for reconciliation, viewing the 
completion of cases beyond 002 as the barometer of the independence of the ECCC, and therefore its legacy 
as an effective judicial mechanism.9 On the other hand, the Cambodian government maintains that further 
prosecutions will undermine processes of reconciliation, and that its conditions for the establishment of the 
ECCC – that only a handful of figures would be indicted – were clear from the start.10 As much as these 
tensions reflect a struggle for control over the ECCC process today, they also reflect a struggle for control 
over national memory. Human rights groups contend that more punishment – a wider range of punitive 
denunciations – will lead to more justice and less impunity. For the Cambodian government, this was always 
a story about the wrongdoing of the (handful of figures still alive in the) KR leadership, and in redressing 
those memories, its own role as ‘saviours’ of the nation could be affirmed, contingently on the containment 
of memory.   
  
As we can see above, there are ongoing contests over what memories are publicly sanctioned and 
foregrounded as part of the national biography. Frictions between different readings of blame implicate 
reconciliation to the extent that competing narratives about the past might be potentially divisive, or even 
harmful, for social relationships (and, according to the Cambodian government, wider political stability). 
Importantly, the ECCC is thought to act as an agent of reconciliation in two ways. On the one hand, the 
limitation of prosecutions, and the exculpation of lower level KR, promotes reconciliation by containing 
memory. This further serves to exclude and displace questions of responsibility from wider experiences of 
political violence that occurred in Cambodia outside of the KR years. On the other, proponents of the ECCC 
further see punishments and denunciations of the KR leadership as reconciliatory because they promote the 
truth and deterring the future recurrence of crimes. The twin processes of concealment and disclosure of the 
past work in tandem, thus working to stabilise memory in the name of reconciliation.  
 
Reconciliation and Memory 
 
The growth and entrenchment of transitional justice means that reconciliation is now an assumed strategy for 
the governance of societies that have experienced conflict and atrocity. Yet while scholars working in 
transitional justice have devoted great energy to pinning down a clear sense of what reconciliation might 
involve, definitions of reconciliation that hold water over time and across different cases remain elusive. My 
approach in this article is not critical of the ‘ideal’ of reconciliation, loosely understood here as a process and 
set of outcomes that involve meaningful changes of relationships that go beyond peaceful co-existence 
between previously conflicting parties.11 However, in recognising the ongoing struggles to define terms, we 
                                               
9 Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘The Future of Cases 003/004 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia’ (2012). http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eccc-report-cases3and4-100112_0.pdf  
10 For example, at the ‘Dealing with a Past Holocaust and National Reconciliation: Learning from Experiences’  
conference (2006), Sean Visoth (a government appointment ECCC administrator) specifically tempered appraisals of 
the need for the ECCC against imperatives of peace and reconciliation.  
11 Clark, Phil. The Gacaca courts, post-genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: justice without lawyers. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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are sensitised to the contingency of the claims that have been advanced in the name of reconciling peoples. 
Reconciliatory initiatives have taken on highly varied forms at different historical moments, and appeals for 
reconciliation are further caught up in the classical dilemma of human rights and transitional justice thinking: 
the need to transform society on the basis of a shared set of collective values, which denouncing past 
wrongs) and the liberal ideal of the production of a reconciled and democratic public space, within which 
competing visions of society can coexist harmoniously.12 Moreover, while reconciliation carries a variety of 
meanings in the extant scholarship, it is important to acknowledge that reconciliation might mean different 
things even within the same contexts and milieus. In recognising that reconciliation – as a set of 
assumptions, ideas and claims made by scholars, practitioners and constituents – is negotiated and contested 
in uneven ways, we might analyse, as Moon invites, appeals for reconciliation as they are propagated on a 
case by case basis.13 These cautionary reflections that emphasise the contingent and political construction of 
reconciliation as sets of claims rather than objective outcomes, direct the focus of this article toward specific 
state sanctioned claims for reconciliation as they emanate from the ECCC, and the importance of analysing 
their reception and negotiation among the ‘perpetrator’ constituents to which they are addressed.    
   
The relationship between reconciliation and memory is complex. Memories are socially mediated and should 
not be treated as stable archives that are the exclusive property of individual psyches. Memories are both 
deeply personal and yet constantly reconstructed through social frameworks that offer them context and 
wider meaning. Memories involve accounts and stories about the past and are therefore the key site for the 
moral adjudication of experiences of conflict and atrocity, and the social relationships that emerge on that 
basis. We must therefore pay attention to the practices, forces and contexts that make memories of atrocities 
either persistent or changing, and the agents that are implicated in attempts to transform or stabilise them.14 
In this sense, the relationship between memory and reconciliation is ambivalent because reconciliation is 
deployed to mean different things at different times, asking memory to deliver different social outcomes in 
different cases e.g. ‘peace’, ‘healing’, ‘truth’, or otherwise. Crucially, we must also recognise how memories 
can be disruptive of reconciliation initiatives. In any given context, memories can challenge claims for 
reconciliation by contesting the substance of what is said about the past - what events and parties must be 
reconciled. They can also contest the ‘appropriate’ moral responses to those pasts and the denunciation or 
affirmation of memories of violence and suffering, whether these are realised through techniques such as 
punishment, apology, reparation or otherwise.   
 
The role of memory in reconciliation therefore hinges on the specific architecture of any claim for 
reconciliation. In many cases, reconciliation is envisaged as a linear process, whereby specific memories 
(and truths) are acknowledged and communities are thought to enjoy expiation as a consequence. A unifying 
characteristic of claims for reconciliation, more broadly, is that they are structured around the establishment 
                                               
12 Arenhövel, Mark. ‘Democratization and transitional justice’ Democratisation 15: 3 (2008): 570-587. 
13 Moon, Claire. Narrating political reconciliation: South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission. (Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2008.) 
14 Olick, Jeffrey K. The politics of regret: On collective memory and historical responsibility. (Routledge, 2013). 
Published 2015 in International Journal of Transitional Justice, 9 (3) pp. 386-406. 
 
 
7 
of a stable and consensual memory of past violence.  Indeed, appeals for reconciliation often graft memories 
into highly specific sequences, ordering memories around a ‘prelapsarian’ untroubled past, episodes of 
rupture and conflict, through to the restoration of states of harmony that are permitted by acts of memory, 
forgiveness and truth telling.15 The enabling of reconciliation through processes of disclosure stands in 
contrast with the assumption that, sometimes, social solidarity and reconciliation are only achievable through 
the concealment and containment of memories that are deemed too disruptive for fragile societies. Indeed, as 
Renan famously remarked,16 the forgetting and erasure of conflicts is often integral to affirming nations and 
national solidarities. On these terms, claims for reconciliation often emerge coextensively with amnesty 
agreements. In some appeals for reconciliation, memory is invoked as a specific object of intervention: 
individual subjects should recognise and disclose their own traumas and be reconciled to their pasts. In 
others, claims for reconciliation specifically subsume individual memories within collective narratives, 
blurring the already porous boundaries between memories of personal experiences and collective histories. 
The core premise at work here is that specific techniques for the management of memory are deployed – 
disclosure and punishment, or containment and exculpation – for reconciliation to be effected in the present. 
In the Cambodian context, ‘national reconciliation’ is based on the assumption that the ECCC can produce 
common narratives about the KR years, based on the denouncement of the KR leadership, and that stable 
relationships with memories of the past are possible thereupon. These frameworks of memory and 
reconciliation set important limits that the actual circulation of perpetrator memories might conflict with, and 
the terms on which might they do.     
 
Anlong Veng 
 
Anlong Veng sits on Cambodia’s northern border with Thailand in a remote and once densely forested 
landscape. Following the four years of KR rule and the Vietnamese capture of the Cambodian interior in 
1979, KR troops and swathes of displaced refugees were pushed into and across the border regions with 
Thailand. The area became a key site of conflict between KR guerrillas and Vietnamese and government 
troops from this point. Located directly across the border from refugee centres used by the KR to launch 
attacks against the PRK, the region was part of the Cambodian state’s attempt to fortify and seal the Thai 
border, known as the ‘K5 plan’. As a consequence, the area is still badly contaminated by landmines and 
other unexploded ordnance. 
 
From 1990 the town changed hands repeatedly between government and KR, though following successive 
amnesty programs deployed by the Cambodian government in the mid-1990s Anlong Veng was left as the 
final stronghold of control for the remaining KR leadership. In mid-1997, Pol Pot ordered the execution of 
                                               
15 Moon, Claire. ‘Prelapsarian state: forgiveness and reconciliation in transitional justice’ International journal for the 
semiotics of law 17, no. 2 (2004): 185-197. 
16 Renan, Ernest “What is a nation?” in Bhabha, Homi K., ed. Nation and narration (Routledge, 2013). 
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Son Sen17 and his family, accusing him of attempting to bargain an amnesty deal with the government side. 
The purge of Son Sen and family forced the other remaining KR factions to act and in June 1997 Pol Pot was 
arrested by KR forces near the Thai border in Anlong Veng under the direction of Ta Mok. Pol Pot was 
subsequently placed on trial, denounced by the remaining KR factions and held under house arrest. In April 
1998 Pol Pot died and his body was cremated on a bed of rubber tires. The site of Pol Pot’s cremation is now 
marked by the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism (MoT) as a historical site.  
 
This specific, local history has consequences for the memories that are reproduced in the Anlong Veng area, 
and therefore reconciliation more broadly, celebrating some ‘heroes’ of the KR but not others. For example, 
recent oral history research conducted by DC-Cam18 in the Anlong Veng area suggests that while there is a 
general sense of ‘guilt’ among former KR, they also celebrate efforts by Ta Mok to build more permanent 
infrastructure in the area such as schools, a hospital, roads and a damn for fishing and irrigation19. The 
valorisation of Ta Mok – rather than other senior KR leaders such as Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Khieu 
Samphan (the latter both currently held at the ECCC), for example – is articulated through memories that 
reference fixed points of community support, development and resources such as the building of schools, 
hospitals, and local infrastructure. When Anlong Veng finally fell to government forces, ‘Ta Mok High 
School’ was renamed ‘Anlong Veng School’, though is still often referred to as the former.20 This article 
echoes some of these findings, while rethinking the implications they have for claims for ‘national 
reconciliation’.  
 
A number of significant recent research contributions on issues of memory among former KR cadre in the 
Anlong Veng area are worth outlining at this point. Noren-Nilsson’s work on questions of nation identity 
among children of former KR – based partly on interviews in Anlong Veng – argues that the 
intergenerational transmission of memories of genocide and war is “cloaked in silence”.21 Noren Nilsson 
suggests that such silence enables children to integrate into the national community by embargoing aspects 
of the past that might conflict with the state sanctioned public history of the KR. At the same time, a 
‘revolutionary’ heritage that promotes ascetic values of hard work and community solidarity is still 
celebrated within former KR communities. This is notable in the sense that revolutionary ethical imperatives 
are reproduced nostalgically in the context of rapid consumer-driven economic development in ways that 
place competing demands on young people in the area. Noren Nillson argues that ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘national’ identities and memories remain in conflict, raising important questions for processes of 
reconciliation in former KR communities.  
                                               
17 Son Sen was a key figure in the KR security apparatus and a member of the KR ‘Central Committee’ leadership 
body.  
18 DC-Cam has conducted oral history work in the Anlong Veng area, though in June 2012 DC-Cam also erected ‘anti-
genocide’ plaques at the local high school as part of a nationwide strategy to educate young Cambodians about the DK 
period..  
19 Eng, Kok Tay. Searching for Truth. Documentation Centre of Cambodia, Phnom Penh. 2012 
20 Wood, Timothy Dylan. "Tracing the Last Breath." (Doctoral Thesis, Rice University. 2009), Pg. 184. Notably, 
although Wood’s fieldwork took place in 2002, several informants in 2009 repeated this specific reference. 
21 Norén-Nilsson, Astrid. "Children of Former KR Cadres." Peace Review 23: 4 (2011): 464. 
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The role of Anlong Veng’s ‘revolutionary’ heritage has been examined by Timothy Wood in research into 
state sponsored conservation efforts in Anlong Veng.22 In 2002 the local authorities (that include numerous 
former KR) were instructed by the Ministry of Tourism (MoT) to preserve and conserve a series of 
‘historical’ locations in the area as part of a tourism and development strategy (coinciding, notably, with the 
national ‘Visit Cambodia 2003’ tourism campaign). The preservation and conservation of these locations 
involved the erection of markers and boards to designate ‘historical importance’ but, Wood emphasises, very 
little else. Wood suggests that the effect of minimal conservation efforts (e.g. the absence of supporting 
textual information and the poor training of tour guides) serves to silence localised, celebratory accounts of 
KR leaders that may conflict with the ‘official’ state sanctioned narrative that lays blame for the atrocities 
perpetrated under DK neatly at their feet. The existence of such accounts again has important implications 
for the reconciliation and the ECCC because they disrupt prevailing narratives of ‘what happened’. The 
questions for reconciliation arise because memories that valorise KR leaders may exist in opposition to the 
way the Cambodian state and the ECCC has narrated blame for atrocities and war at their hands. At the same 
time, as this articles explores, we find puzzling examples of perpetrator memories that seem acquiescent to 
the principle of the ECCC prosecutions even when they appear ‘unreconciled’. 
 
Notes on fieldwork and data 
 
The period of fieldwork informing this research took place in Anlong Veng in April and May 2009 as part of 
a wider nine month multi-sited ethnography examining the politics of memory and reconciliation in 
Cambodia in the context of the ECCC. The rationale for research in Anlong Veng was to explore the way 
that former perpetrators were (re)negotiating relationships to memories of the KR in the context of the 
ECCC. The article draws on participant observation data gathered in the context of heritage sites in the 
Anlong Veng area, fourteen depth interviews with local residents, principally former KR, as well as 
informal, field-noted conversations with community members. Three non-KR members of the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces stationed near Anlong Veng were also interviewed as they visited heritage sites in 
the area.23 
 
The case of Anlong Veng opens up possibilities for understanding the relationship between memory and 
reconciliation because it is governed and populated by former KR cadre and was home to several senior KR 
leaders. On the one hand, this means that Anlong Veng represents a unique research context, raising 
important questions for the broader conclusions that can be garnered from this research. Firstly, the Anlong 
Veng community is composed largely of former KR and their families, who themselves moved to the area 
from other parts of Cambodia during the civil war; non-KR residents tend to have moved to the area from 
                                               
22 Wood, 23  
23 All informants have been anonymised except where the offer of confidentiality was waived. Fieldwork adhered to 
ethical guidelines as laid out by the XXX Research Ethics Policy and Procedures, available at XXX 
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2001 onward. This necessarily means that this article does not address more intimate (and often challenging) 
questions of interpersonal reconciliation that remain outstanding in other areas of Cambodia. Important 
analysis by Laura McGrew attends to these forms of reconciliation in greater depth, for example, arguing 
that what we see in Cambodia are often relationships of coexistence rather than ‘deeper’ forms of 
reconciliation.24 Secondly, it is crucial to bear in mind that memories of the KR and their leadership are 
contested among former cadre, both within Anlong Veng and also across former KR zones. The celebration 
of specific KR leaders is very different in other Cambodian provinces that were dominated by or sympathetic 
to the KR, often dependent on the factional patronage networks that were historically in place (and often still 
persist today).25 This means that we must be wary of developing generalised readings of the memories of the 
KR in Cambodia. While recognising these important limits, the uniqueness of the case also foregrounds its 
importance as a window for understanding perpetrator memories and their implications for reconciliation. 
Historically and more recently, the Cambodian government and now ECCC have positioned lower level 
perpetrators as key parties to reconciliation. The community has been targeted by ECCC outreach groups 
like DC-Cam as an important locale for reconciliation initiatives and the provision of genocide education. On 
this basis, the conversations and encounters presented here are important less for developing a general 
account of perpetrator memories in Cambodia, but because of the specific ways they illustrate how it is 
possible to think and speak about the politics of memory and reconciliation in Cambodia.  
 
Ambivalent encounters 
 
In my early visits to the Anlong Veng I was eager to develop a more general sense of the different 
perspectives on the relationship of former KR cadre to their pasts. At one of the MoT conservation sites, I 
asked one former fighter if people still think about the KR and the war: 
   
People in Anlong Veng don’t all think the same way. A lot of people think that Ta Mok was a good man, but 
mostly people talk about the past less. Over the past thirty years it is like two different lives, from the worst to 
the best. People talk about that time [the war/KR] less and less. The younger generation will forget about the 
KR. Because now is better, with the roads and all that. This place will be like Poipet26, another prosperous 
border crossing, of course people will forget the harder times. 
 
I: Why do you think prosperity means forgetting? 
 
People don’t want to remember those times when things become peaceful. Now with the court [the ECCC], 
people don’t want to talk about that time. People here, they don’t want to get called as a witness.27 
 
                                               
24 McGrew, Laura. "Reconciliation in Cambodia: Victims and Perpetrators Living Together, Apart." (PhD diss., 
Coventry University, UK. 2011) 
25 See XXX (anon author) 
26 Poipet is another border town into Thailand in Western Cambodia.  
27 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, April 2009 
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On the one hand, the former fighter’s comment illuminates the belief held among (some) former KR fighters 
that ‘history’ (as retold by the state) has unfairly demonised senior KR figures like Ta Mok. In the first 
instance, we could see how this poses challenges in terms of reconciling such perspectives to the cause of the 
ECCC, and the direct reference to residents’ reluctance to testify points to fears and suspicion about the work 
of the court and a betrayal of loyalties. My informants, more broadly, sought assurances that my research 
was unconnected to the ECCC, revealing anxieties about both what could and should be disclosed about the 
past. At the same time, these anxieties conflict with a general sense that forgetting was an inevitable process 
of economic change and the conviction that the younger generation will forget the KR illustrates the 
challenges for reconciliatory initiatives that attempt to transform memories of the KR by educating younger 
sections of society about the need to remember. On the other hand, the comment shows how complicated the 
relationship between memory and reconciliation can be. In downplaying the significance of memories of the 
conflict in the wake of peace, the informant points to the way in which communities are active in negotiating 
and demarcating their own senses of ‘old’ and ‘new’ eras (without necessarily needing a formal mechanism 
to do so). The description of ‘two lives’ – then and now – points to Stan Cohen’s suggestion that flux, 
change and rapid development can effect ‘discontinuities’ of memory, or ‘slippage’.28 For Cohen, this is one 
feature of the key paradox of denial: knowing and not knowing the past all at once. At the same time, the 
link between prosperity and forgetting seems to imply the possibility that problematic or challenging 
memories are less likely to be maintained under conditions of material improvement, i.e. that economic 
development seems to act as a mitigating influence on the memory of painful pasts. In this sense, it is 
perhaps less a question of ‘knowing’ and yet ‘not knowing’ and more a process of negotiating which aspects 
of the past are congruent with ongoing material priorities. This is important because it shows that 
Cambodians have actively renegotiated the significance of memories of political violence against present 
economic priorities; such economic priorities are dislocated from reconciliatory processes that are principally 
legal and juridical. 
   
At Pol Pot’s cremation site, efforts had been made to protect both the remains and the presentation of the 
grave. A number of small offerings and incense sticks were present at the foot of the memorial structure, 
though the corrugated iron roofing and small wooden perimeter fencing did not convey great ‘reverence’. 
The MoT sign simply read ‘Pol Pot was cremated’ here and no further information is supplied concerning 
the circumstance or background to his death. The minimalist preservation and memorialisation of the resting 
place of ‘Brother Number One’ reflected conflicted memories of the different KR leaders among lower level 
cadre, implicating important perspectives about responsibility. As one remarked: 
 
Pol Pot was at the top. The top was responsible. He was responsible for everything. This is why everyone labels 
him a bad man, because he was responsible for the destruction of Cambodia.  
 
I: So people here remember him that way?  
                                               
28 Cohen, Stanley. States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 243 
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Even the smaller generals did terrible things. But it’s not clear, we have different ideas. Yes, Ta Mok is a hero 
for the people here, but we cannot say this in public. We cannot say [here] but we can say with our friends, with 
our families.29 
 
On the one hand, the former fighter recognises the ‘destruction’ of Cambodia, locating responsibility at the 
hands of Pol Pot. This is important evidence of the traction of the reconciliatory narrative of blame 
propagated by the Cambodian state since the fall of the KR: that the revolution was hijacked by a genocidal 
KR leadership, and the subsequent PRK government were true heirs to the revolution. At the same time, we 
again can see the existence of memories that conflict with the state-sanctioned account of the KR because Ta 
Mok – a specifically local hero – is celebrated and the fighter further complicates his reading of 
responsibility by noting the role of ‘smaller generals’ (a hugely sensitive topic given the role of formerly 
mid-ranking KR officials within Anlong Veng’s local government, and the possible prosecutions under 
Cases 003 and 004 at the ECCC). Perhaps most tellingly, the view that Ta Mok could not be celebrated in 
public points to a rupture and disjunction between ‘community’ level and ‘private’ remembrances of the life 
of the former KR leader, supporting Noren-Nilsson’s claim that discussion of the KR past is ‘off limits’.30 I 
asked about this issue further:  
 
I: Why can’t you say that in public? 
 
In this area, most of the hierarchy people [authorities] are from the KR. But a lot of the local authorities are from 
the government too. So the smaller KR people, some of them are worried about saying the wrong thing… People 
talk with their friends about that time. That time was troubled. Yes, Pol Pot brought destruction, but now 
everyone just sees his faults. It is disappointing, he was a strong man. 
 
It is revealing that, following the former fighter’s suggestion that there are limits to what can and cannot be 
said in public and private about the KR as a topic, the fighter returns to discuss Pol Pot, suggesting that 
people only see his faults. On the one hand, we can see how the fighter may be acceding to what he 
considers publicly acceptable comments on the KR leadership. On the other, we can read his latter comments 
as evidence of conflicted memories of the KR leaders. The former KR of Anlong would rarely deny or 
downplay the magnitude of the suffering of the KR years. At the same time, they often talked about their 
former leaders melancholically, on nostalgic terms, as painful but comforting memories.31 Informally, 
interviewees and other former KR seemed conflicted about the ECCC, offering a tentative acceptance of the 
need for prosecutions, while insisting that their former leaders were not ‘bad men’. These recollections were 
often intertwined with personal attempts to vindicate their own involvement in the movement, as patriots 
                                               
29 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
30 Noren-Nilsson, 19 at 464 
31 Memory studies scholars researching nostalgia point out that nostalgia is not innocent and is often exclusionary, but 
tends to reflect discomfort and the yearning for stability in the face of change and flux. See Atia, Nadia, and Jeremy 
Davies. "Nostalgia and the shapes of history Editorial." Memory Studies 3, no. 3 (2010): 181-186.   
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fighting for their country. To the extent that such memories seek to elevate of celebrate the lives of KR 
leaders, they conflict with state-sponsored varieties of reconciliation because they seem to disrupt the 
denunciation of KR leadership, and the needs and expectations of wider victim constituencies 
notwithstanding. Yet the same former KR also tended to accept the need for prosecutions and recognised the 
wrongs of the past.  
 
In Anlong Veng town, the most prominent heritage site pertaining to the conflict is Ta Mok’s ‘Historic 
House’. The house itself looks out over one of Ta Mok’s local infrastructure projects, a dam across a river 
and a large lake on the flooded land created as a result. I asked one (former KR) local resident about the site: 
  
Some domestic tourists come here, but just as a vacation, for relaxation. People come here because they 
want to know the history. They want to know the life of Ta Mok, the way he lived. He was a hero in this 
region because he protected the country, he moved his troops here, fighting the Vietnamese.   
 
I: Do mostly Khmer people come here?  
 
Mostly Cambodians. Some from Anlong Veng, but also many from outside. More so at weekends. The 
place is good for a picnic. A few foreigners come also to learn the history also.32 
 
On the one hand, this is a recreational space. On the other, the root of the authority of the site as a historic 
house, is an ‘attraction’ and ‘fascination’ with Ta Mok as a ‘hero’ or national ‘protector’. This complicates 
the role of Ta Mok’s historic house because it transcends purportedly ‘un-reconciled’ parties: the attraction 
of a patriotic protector comes about specifically from understandings of the nation and nationalism that 
resonate with both former KR audiences and visitors from outside Anlong Veng. The role of this space as a 
‘national’ attraction, affirming solidarity for both KR and non-KR audiences, elides its role as a historical 
marker of the life of a man implicated in atrocity and past national conflict.    
 
The majority of visitors were Cambodians from outside the local area. The local resident’s references to 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ people (meaning former KR residents and or those visiting/settling since the end of the 
war) are important: “Now the outside people come more and more, they visit and we are fine with them. We 
were not responsible for the conflict, it was the leaders.” Again, this comment reflects to the complex 
relationship of memory and claims for reconciliation. The resident suggests that there are no divisions 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ specifically because only senior KR leaders were responsible for the 
conflict. This is evidence of the traction of a reconciliatory politics that blames the few while absolving the 
many, as manifest at the ECCC. At the same, the resident is hagiographic in his previous description of Ta 
Mok, and suggests that non-KR audiences (including victims) are attracted to the site because of his role as a 
patriotic figure. An important question arises here. Why do KR and non-KR audiences celebrate Ta Mok as a 
                                               
32 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
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patriot at the same time as supporting ECCC endeavours to reckon with the atrocities that are inextricably 
bound to his life? Is it possible that Ta Mok can be remembered as a ‘butcher’ and ‘hero’ to his acolytes and 
adversaries? The reverence of a KR leader here persists despite the work of the ECCC, chiming even with 
victim audiences. It appears that the reframing of Ta Mok as a patriot, in this context, is presented on a 
different register to claims over his responsibility for the perpetration of atrocity.  
 
The themes of reconciliation, patriotism and the integrity of national borders became increasingly 
pronounced in a series of conversations I had with a group of serving Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
soldiers visiting Ta Mok’s lakeside house. These conversations, in particular, perhaps help us understand the 
conflicted positioning of Ta Mok as ‘hero’ and ‘villain’. A crucial contextual factor that coloured much of 
the fieldwork in Anlong Veng was a simmering border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia arising from 
the contested territorial ownership of the UNESCO-designated Preah Vihear temple World Heritage Site 
(located roughly 120km east of Anlong Veng). The dispute had stoked nationalist sentiments on either side 
of the border and a series of clashes between Cambodian and Thai forces near the temple in October 2008 
and January and April 2009 had led to a number of casualties and several fatalities. As a consequence, the 
border with Thailand as a whole had become an increasingly sensitive, militarised space. As well as its 
proximity to the border itself, Anlong Veng was also located along one of the main routes to the disputed 
Preah Vihear temple. Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) troops on leave or breaking journeys to and 
from Preah Vihear were among the frequent visitors to Ta Mok’s house. One soldier explained why they had 
chosen to visit: 
 
This man was a patriot. He fought for Cambodia. Of course I want to see this place.33 
 
The recognition of the site’s historical significance stems again because Ta Mok is repositioned as a patriot. 
Another suggested that: 
 
This is a historic site. It is an important place for Cambodia. 
 
I: Why is it important? I read that before during the war the army was fighting this man. 
 
That time is gone and his followers left him so now we are a country at peace.34 
 
In the second instance, I wanted to ask about any potential conflict between loyalties to the ‘state’ (army) 
and reasons for visitation. It is telling that the soldier’s response coincides with a state-sponsored 
understanding of reconciliation i.e. that in the absence of conflict the nation is at peace, and with the 
disintegration of the KR as a military force, there is no conflict around which to reconcile. It seems in this 
                                               
33 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
34 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
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context Ta Mok can be recast through a new but resonant national lens.  On a separate occasion, standing in 
front of a large map of Cambodia in Ta Mok’s villa, another soldier remarked that:    
 
He protected Cambodia. He was fighting the invaders. Just like now, we have problems again. The Thai 
people want to take Cambodian land. That is why we are going to the border. 35 
 
The direct parallel attempted here between the two ‘invading’ forces illuminates how the nation, its borders 
and its vulnerabilities is felt by remembering ‘national’ subjects: threat and obligation are foregrounded; 
memories of atrocity - that are the pivot of ongoing reconciliatory initiatives - are eschewed. The anxieties 
concerning national defence, the role of soldiers in maintaining the integrity of borders and the historical 
equivalence suggested here between Vietnamese occupation (fought by Ta Mok) and Thai incursions (fought 
by the current RCAF soldiers) not only allows for more sympathetic remembrances of KR figures like Ta 
Mok, but allows and obliges a ‘celebratory’ reframing of the past conflict. In terms of how we understand 
memory and its place within transitional justice, we must again be attentive to the range of influences that 
recast or oblige acts of memory, rather than treating the past as a stable archive for excavation or extraction. 
In this case, we could say that (highly dispersed) discourses of nation and nationalism coincide with 
memories that elevate and celebrate figures such as Ta Mok, specifically because his life can be recast as 
characterised by national sacrifice; his role in the commission and perpetration of atrocity is eschewed. 
    
During my final visit to Ta Mok’s ‘historic house’ I attempted to invite some visiting RCAF soldiers to 
discuss issues of reconciliation and the ECCC more directly. As one soldier’s remarks indicate, the topics 
seemed almost inert: 
 
Before Khmer fought Khmer. Now Cambodia is peaceful and it doesn’t matter what faction [you were 
on] before… Before, in the Pol Pot time, some people in my family died. But it is complicated politics. I 
know that people here [residents of Anlong Veng] think Ta Mok was right to fight and he defended 
Cambodia.36  
 
It is notable again that the thorny history of Khmers in conflict with other Khmers is remembered as the 
central problematic characteristic of Cambodia’s experiences of war and genocide, i.e. as a crisis of national 
solidarity. Moreover, within this framework, peace is again equated with reconciliation, with the ‘erasure’ of 
those factions, or the closing of that ‘national’ rupture. As Dunnage suggests with reference to memories of 
‘perpetrators’, ‘re-visitations of the past are inevitably conditioned by the imperative of national or group 
cohesion in the present’.37 On the one hand, the soldier remembers both those ‘factionalisms’ and his 
personal experiences of loss. In this sense, we should not read his comments as downplaying the significance 
                                               
35 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
36 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
37 Dunnage, Jonathan. "Perpetrator memory and memories about perpetrators Editorial." Memory Studies 3, no. 2 
(2010): 91-94. 
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of the KR past. Yet on the other, the soldier acknowledges and is erudite toward the specific views of former 
KR cadre in Anlong Veng, without reflecting any explicit grievance. It seems, in this instance, that there 
does not appear to be a conflict between remembering the wrongs of the KR, and tolerance toward memories 
that celebrate their leaders.  
 
Another soldier was keen to find out if I worked for the court. Despite my denials, he seemed eager to talk 
about the frequent  suggestions made by the Cambodian government that ECCC prosecutions could provoke 
the resumption of conflict. He was convinced that this would not be the case because, he suggested, people 
were no longer ‘angry’. In the first instance, for supporters of the ECCC, this may vindicate objections to 
unrestricted prosecutions of KR figures. Yet, the soldier’s suggestion of a diminishing ‘anger’ is also 
striking: diminished ‘anger’ among perpetrators and their victims implies that memories of the KR, around 
which Cambodians are asked to reconcile, are weakening. On the one hand, this foregrounds the importance 
of recognising Cambodian communities’ resilience and establishment of relationships to memories of the KR 
outside of formal techniques or interventions like the ECCC. On the other, we must treat claims for 
diminishing anger cautiously because memory is always contextually maintained as an active rather than 
inevitable or automated process. On this point, it is important to remind ourselves of the investment of victim 
constituencies at the ECCC in relief of these encounters. Some victim groups need and expect contrition 
from the surviving KR leadership. Some victim groups also often assume the ECCC is able to deliver 
outcomes beyond its mandate, in particular, financial compensation or the ability to order capital 
punishment.38 In this light, the place of perpetrator memories that seem, paradoxically, ‘unreconciled’ in the 
way they celebrate the KR leadership, and yet acquiescent to the principle of punishing those responsible for 
a period of terrible loss challenges our understanding of what reconciliation in Cambodia can and should 
look like. If the persistence of such perpetrator memories is dislocated from formal processes of 
reconciliation – neither necessarily challenging or in accordance with the ECCC - must they be transformed? 
Conversely, if they offend the needs of victim constituencies, can we see the persistence of such counter-
memories as ‘reconciled’ within a public sphere where competing narratives about the past co-exist?  
 
 
Several kilometres north of Anlong Veng town is the site of Ta Mok’s memorial stupa. In 2003 the MoT 
designated the site as ‘historically significant’ as part of the area heritage tourism strategy because it had 
hosted a large sawmill during the civil war (now marked ‘Ta Mok’s Saw Mill’ on blue MoT signage), the 
revenue from which was a key source of income for the KR insurgency. In July 2006, after Ta Mok’s death 
under detention in Phnom Penh, Ta Mok’s body was taken to the site at the behest of his daughter. Hundreds 
of local residents attended his funeral and the erection of a memorial stupa that month. At the time of 
fieldwork, work was nearing completion on the construction of a larger, more ornate memorial to replace the 
initial structure erected at the time of his death.  
                                               
38 For example, in October 2014, Victim Associations held protests against the “worthless” reparations proposed under 
Case 002/01. See, https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/victims-call-for-compensation-from-eccc-70135/. Last 
accessed 29th May 2015.    
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The Srah Chouk Pagoda was built in the years after the end of the war and relies on donations from local 
residents and the Khmer diaspora. The pagoda now also houses a community of monks who provide 
teaching and religious rites for the community. Given the KR’s past ideological commitment to the abolition 
of organised religion, I asked one monk about the relationship between former KR local residents and the 
pagoda:     
 
People in this area were all KR. You know, some of them don’t want to make merit39 at all and people are 
very sensitive about talking about the Ta Mok history and taking part at the pagoda… this area is just 
developing in the last three or four years.40 
 
The monk again points to frictions in what can and cannot be said in public in Anlong Veng about the past 
but subsumes those frictions under a reflection on economic progress. Reconciliation, as he envisaged it, 
seemed secondary to, or contingent upon, material development. I pressed this issue in relation to the 
remembrance of Ta Mok:   
 
I: It has changed quickly. I first came to Anlong Veng in 2003 just after the war and it’s very different. 
Should people remember Ta Mok by building places like this? This is the biggest stupa here, are there 
many others? 
 
Soon there will be many stupas because people will start to understand. Some local people think the stupa 
[to Ta Mok] is good, some people say it is not relevant. Some people think he deserves this place [the 
stupa], and for the memory, that it is important to remember. But you know, many people just want to 
forget. They don’t care. 
 
I: Why don’t they care anymore? 
 
I’m not sure. It is not like people don’t care, but it is just not so important now. 
    
In the first instance, the monk’s comments indicate the importance of pagodas to the normative ordering and 
anchoring of Cambodian public life.41 While the monk’s earlier remarks that former KR members were less 
inclined to engage in religious practice, his latter comment indicates an important but ambivalent link 
between the stupa and community remembrance of Ta Mok. To ‘deserve’ a stupa in accordance with Khmer 
Buddhist practice is to be revered as a public figure of great significance. At the same time, the monk’s 
suggestion that people are eager to forget Ta Mok is located on a register of contemporary material and 
economic priorities. This again evidences the way that memories that valorise Ta Mok (and the KR 
                                               
39 Making merit refers to Buddhist and animistic ceremonies that are intended to be spiritually enriching but also ward 
off inauspicious spiritual forces. As one monk explained to me, they are often treated as ‘good luck’ rituals. 
40 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, April 2009 
41 Kent, Alexandra. "Purchasing power and pagodas: The Sīma monastic boundary and consumer politics in 
Cambodia." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 38:2 (2007): 335-354. 
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leadership) are conflicted on multiple grounds. They persistently appear to disrupt the state-sponsored and 
ECCC denunciations of the KR leaders but also routinely foreground the importance of material and 
economic progress ahead of any duty to remember. After several encounters with former KR that celebrated 
Ta Mok’s memory on the basis of the infrastructure he had built for the community, the monk’s suggestion 
that he would be forgotten in the wake of material and economic progress highlighted how wider contexts 
reframe memory in contradictory ways. The monk’s comments chime with wider fieldwork encounters in 
Anlong Veng. Former KR were more eager to talk about jobs and income as material priorities ahead of any 
political opposition to the Cambodian state, or ECCC. As one former cadre asked, “People have to think 
about their standard of living, and after three decades of war, why would we think about the ECCC?”42 In 
this sense, it is a wider set of economic forces conditioning processes of reconciliation, as such, rather than 
principally juridical or symbolic interventions. More broadly, given the investment of the former KR in 
Anlong Veng in the material development of the area, these conversations seem at odds with the Cambodian 
government’s claim that further prosecutions at the ECCC could reactivate latent political divisions.  
 
Outside the grounds of the Srah Chouk Pagoda, one of Ta Mok’s daughters runs a small shop. A large 
portrait of her father hangs on the back wall, depicting him in his younger years. As noted, at the time of 
fieldwork Ta Mok’s stupa was undergoing reconstruction. I was keen to ascertain how and why a more 
ornate memorial was being erected:  
 
I: I was told there was a memorial here previously. Why did they rebuild the memorial for Ta Mok? 
 
It’s the kindness and generosity of his children toward the family, and because he is one of the heroes. 
Not only his children, our neighbours, and friends too. He was the owner of the land, the waters. We built 
the previous one just temporarily, this is the permanent one.43 
 
The upkeep and erection of stupas in Cambodia tends to rely on family and community donations, 
particularly in the case of community or religious leaders that are deemed worthy of exceptional reverence. 
In this instance, Ta Mok’s daughter locates this through an understanding of her father as ‘heroic’, but also 
employs a specific phrase – ‘the owner of the land, the waters’ – that conveys a spiritual and paternalist 
quality to both his life and the obligation to remember; reverence, here, is expressed through a sacralisation 
of his memory. The consecration of Ta Mok’s memory is another example of the way his life is re-
remembered under new and shifting (religious) frameworks.  
 
The presence of a well-established memorial to Ta Mok, in comparison to Pol Pot’s cremation site, was a 
key point of interest for understanding local memory frictions and their implications for reconciliation. 
Given her direct connection to the KR leadership, I was keen to explore this with Ta Mok’s daughter:   
 
                                               
42 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, April 2009 
43 Personal interview, Anlong Veng, Cambodia, May 2009 
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I: Why does Ta Mok have this memorial but Pol Pot doesn’t have one?  
 
Pol Pot ran the whole country. But for Ta Mok he was responsible for this area only, but only last… He 
built the infrastructure. He built the roads, the foundations for how they are now, they are still used. He 
built many schools and the hospital, and the bridge too. People know this. They know it was him that he 
gave the services. 
 
I: And do people still talk about the time when Ta Mok was in charge? 
 
I don’t know. He was the father to all people in this area. Even his children, he didn’t give much money 
to us. The money went to services for everyone. He looked after everyone in the area. He gave people 
land and money to poor people. Everyone must have something, he believed… I am his daughter; of 
course I am proud of him. He was a hero of the KR. Everyone had enough to eat. The irrigation system 
meant that there was plenty of fish, so much fish. If I say he is a hero, of course I would think that. To 
understand Ta Mok you need to ask other people in Anlong Veng.   
 
I: What about the other leaders? Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea? The ones on trial. 
 
I don’t really know about them… [Continued below]   
 
These comments are illuminating for several reasons. In the first instance, the marginalisation of memories 
of Pol Pot (and other KR leaders) could be read to follow from the factional infighting that characterised the 
final days of the KR insurgency. Pol Pot’s internal purges of Son Sen and his family in 1997 led to his public 
denunciation by other senior KR figures, including Ta Mok. Moreover, other senior members of the KR 
leadership like Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea (both currently held on charges at the ECCC) had 
surrendered by 1998. In this sense, the maintenance of memories that celebrate Ta Mok seem to hinge upon 
his role as the last champion of the KR cause: he was, so to speak, the ‘last man standing’. On the one hand, 
we could read this as memory that conflicts with the ECCC because it seems to illuminate a resistant 
“victors” narrative within the wider context of a defeated insurgency. On the other, it is striking that Ta 
Mok’s daughter specifically suggests his contributions to Anlong Veng as obliging his remembrance. The 
way that the physical ‘artefacts’ of Ta Mok’s life are pointed to as memory ‘cues’ – schools, a hospital, 
bridges, the irrigation system – seems to again show how the reproduction of celebratory accounts of Ta 
Mok are coloured by nostalgia rather than any notion that former KR subscribe to accounts of the past that 
could lead to a resumption of conflict. This also shows that functional ‘artefacts’ (infrastructure such as 
schools or hospitals) of the past – ‘place memory’ according to Connerton  – shape remembering as much as 
specific sites of memory, such as museums and memorials.44 Moreover, Ta Mok’s daughter seemed to 
acknowledge (self-reflexively) her reasoning for cherishing his memory: how could she not be proud of her 
father? In this sense, we must further reconsider the way memories that laud the KR leadership can be 
                                               
44 Connerton, Paul. How modernity forgets. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
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thought to disrupt reconciliation as such. In this instance, the celebration of Ta Mok is rooted in a familial 
relationship, rather than his role within a history of political violence over which the ECCC adjudicates. 
Again, though, we are invited to rethink the relationship of such memories to the varying expectations and 
needs of victim constituencies elsewhere in Cambodia.  
 
The contrast between a tendency toward hagiography and the more ‘everyday’ priorities of memory was 
captured in one of Ta Mok’s daughter’s final remarks:     
 
[Continued from above]…People in this area believe he [Ta Mok] possessed a spiritual power. When they 
brought his body here [from custody in Phnom Penh]. It rained, such strong rain, all day it rained. And 
the people felt very cold. 
 
I: What lessons are there to learn from your father’s life? 
 
People here just want peace now. They want their children to feel peace and be secure, to make money 
and earn a living. 
 
Again, Ta Mok’s daughter sacralises Ta Mok’s memory (as embodying a spiritual power) – in this instance, 
on animistic rather than Buddhist terms – and juxtaposes this representation with the ‘lessons’ of his life: that 
people simply want peace and prosperity. The apparent contradiction between the lionisation of ‘the butcher’ 
and the suggestion that people ‘just’ want peace seems to capture the peculiar, ambivalent states of memory 
that exist in Anlong Veng.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Perpetrator memories and memories of perpetrators in Anlong Veng are vexed. They are rooted in the local 
history of Anlong Veng, but also respond to national exhortations to remember in the way they implicate far 
wider histories of political violence. They pose conflicts with the national biography but seem internally and 
locally contradictory in their own right. There are memories that appear, on the surface, at odds with the 
denunciation of the KR leadership at the ECCC. These should, in many senses, challenge the possibility of 
reconciling parties to a consensual reading of past violence, and the resonance of the ECCC as it attempts to 
stabilise a public narrative of the KR years as a foundation for reconciliation. This article, however, has tried 
to show in the stories and encounters retold here that the implications of perpetrator memories for 
reconciliation are themselves often conflicted, illustrating the limits, traction and dissonances that 
characterise the intersection of state-sanctioned and locally embedded claims over memory.  
 
Memories of perpetrators exist in multiply conflicted ways. The hagiographic memories of Ta Mok stand in 
ambivalent relation to the state-sanctioned and ECCC reading of past political violence. They are not 
‘reconciled’ but coincided frequently with acquiescence to the need for prosecutions of the KR leadership. 
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The celebration of Ta Mok as a patriot, even among several non-KR informants, further indicates the power 
of contemporary nationalist tropes of patriotism, vulnerability and solidarity in subsuming memories of his 
role in the perpetration of atrocity. Furthermore, Ta Mok’s memory tended to be lauded by former KR on 
registers dislocated from the judicial denunciation of the KR at the ECCC. They pointed to his local 
contribution to the area – the schools, hospitals, and roads he built – over any memories that glorified the 
cause or ideals of the KR. Against this, the former KR of Anlong Veng located such reflections as 
diminishing in relevance against the material priorities of their everyday lives. Memories of perpetrators can 
be both amplified and muted inconsistently to formal reconciliatory endeavours. Importantly, this further 
elides claims by the Cambodian government that prosecutions could jeopardise peace and stability because 
of latent fissures in Cambodian society, or lingering KR grievances.   
 
What place do perpetrator memories and memories of perpetrators have in post-atrocity spaces? I would 
suggest that there are no easy answers to be gleaned from this case, where ‘unreconciled’ memories seem to 
persist alongside and often, contrarily, acquiescent toward a mechanism intended to denounce them (and yet 
insensitive to the varied needs of wider communities of victims). Reconciliation, as a set of ideas and 
practices, may always be troubled by the conflicting ‘meta’ aims of transitional justice: repairing social 
fabrics requires denouncing what ruptured them and the contrition of perpetrators; the liberal goals of peace 
and reconciliation foreground the importance of free speech and a public sphere in which competing 
narratives of the past coexist. The purpose of this article is not to arbitrate the appropriate point at which 
perpetrator memories should be curtailed, or to advocate for their recognition. Rather, the article has shown 
how locally embedded perpetrator memories can converge with, disrupt and elude the formal politics of 
‘national reconciliation’ emanating from the ECCC.  
 
 
    
 
